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Abstract: This Trends article discusses the political psychological impact of the deaths of Saddam
Hussein’s two oldest sons at the hands of United States military forces.
The deaths of Saddam Hussein’s two oldest sons at the hands of United States (US) military forces is
largely being promulgated by US Government representatives as a huge victory towards the end-state of
a democratic and economically viable Iraq. The rationale for this position is that True Believers in
Saddam Hussein and the Baathist Party now can see the handwriting on the wall. There will be no
restoration of a Saddam Hussein or a Baathist controlled government.
The main problem with this rationale is that it is based on the assumption that the main resistance
against US initiatives in Iraq have been coming, are coming, and will come from fanatic supporters of
Saddam Hussein and/or the Baathist Party. In actuality, the resistance is much more associates with
many other segments of an internal and also a global population. These segments include but are not
limited to religious groups that view US intervention as anathema, groups that are mercenary in that
they see their mercenary desires being thwarted, other groups that view US activity as a vile
contaminant of culture, groups that are anti-US based on sheer petulance and insouciance, and yet
other groups influenced by Messianism, politico-military correlations of forces, and postmodern
unfathomableness.
The road to a democratic and economically viable Iraq may prove to be a strategic blunder. If this is not
to be, eyes need to be opened and public discourse needs to reflect the true sources of resistance. In
such matters, Uday and Qusay are but pawns alive and now dead in a greater game. (See Fillkins, D.
(July 24, 2003). Images of Hussein’s sons are released by the U.S. The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com; Knowlton, B. (July 23, 2003). Killing of Hussein’s sons should reassure Iraqis,
Bush says. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Lt. Gen. Sanchez Press Briefing on Uday and
Qusay Hussein (DoD Transcript) (July 22, 2003). FreeRepublic.com.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/950801/posts; Mackey, S. (July 24, 2003). Better alive than
dead. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com. ) (Keywords: Baathist Party, Bush Administration,
Saddam Hussein, Iraq.)
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